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I want to decline Rob Howse’s invitation to talk about my own residual anxieties,
because he introduces another more interesting theme into the debate: whether
scholarship can actually be traded between countries. He suggests that such trade
exists, though apparently only in one direction: “It is not as if Americans are going to
buy their doctrinal scholarship from Germany […]; on the other hand, some forms of
interdisciplinary scholarship from the US may well be exportable to Germany.”
But it was not always so. There was a time, prior to World War I, when many
Americans were indeed eager to “buy” their doctrinal scholarship from Germany.
The influence of 19th century German legal science on what has come to be called
“classical legal thought” in the United States can hardly be overestimated. It can be
found in the work of US luminaries like Holmes, Pound, Fuller/Purdue, Llewellyn, and
many others. And it can be seen in the history of American legal education in the
19th century. Duncan Kennedy has described this German influence as the first of
his three globalizations of legal thought
That influence decreased when Germany became the enemy in World War I
(symbolized most perfectly perhaps in Karl Llewellyn, who fought this war first
in the German and later in the US army). And the fruits of the influence were all
but eradicated when legal realism (which, itself, found influences from Germany,
especially the late Jhering) rejected the “legal science” borrowed from German
formalism that had become untenable, and replaced it with a new scientific approach
that sought objectivity in disciplines other than law—economics, psychology, political
science, a science of values, etc. The interdisciplinary strength was born and grew
strong. After World War II, when German law was thoroughly discarded, “the wind
changed”—US law became dominant and began to influence the law, both in Europe
and elsewhere.
One can debate whether these respective influences constitute a trade in legal
ideas, in which the best product finds the most consumers. Perhaps they are rather
evidence of hegemony, in which a strong country—19th century Germany, 20th
century US—imposes its respective legal culture on others. But reality is more
complex. After all, although we sometimes think that ideas remain unchanged by
their transfer, this is rarely the case. In reality, models from one country rarely fit
another country. Instead, they function as irritants that are either rejected, or create
an impulse of local reform. In my last post I mentioned an example of effective
rejection: the Americanization of Japanese legal education as an example of a
transfer that failed, because the US model was not adapted to the recipient system.
The German Council of Science and Humanities proposes an adaptation—rather
than trying to Americanize German scholarship and education, it suggests that
reform can take up influences from elsewhere, and combine them with local tradition.
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If Rob Howse finds this insufficient, this may be so because he does not focus on an
entire culture. He takes issue with my focus on the average scholar in each country
—we should, he thinks, rather focus on excellence. I find this problematic—the
vast majority of US lawyers are not educated at NYU (or even Duke), and the vast
majority of German academic scholarship remains focused on German doctrine. If
both reports on legal education that spurred this forum focus on the entire system,
not just the top institutions, they do the right thing.
But his emphasis on excellence raises a further interesting question. Could it be
that the trade and exchange of scholarship are becoming elite privileges? Do they
create a globalized elite of legal scholars worldwide, while other institutions become
marginalized? In the United States, where the difference between the best and the
worst law schools is enormous, the best schools (Harvard, NYU, perhaps even
Duke) have the ability to initiate and shape a global discourse (though Christopher
McCrudden, in his recent post, points out how much more internationalized UK
schools are). But most US schools do not have that ability, and the ABA report
certainly does not encourage them to.
And in Germany, one problem is that (as I am told) universities put so many
demands on their professors that it becomes hard for them to find the time
and resources to produce good and broad scholarship that is not doctrinal.
Consequently, much of the scholarship that is globally influential takes place outside
of the law faculties. It is not a coincidence that all three German scholars whom
Howse mentions as influential have tenuous relations to traditional German law
faculties—Armin von Bogdandy directs a Max-Planck Institute; Christian Joerges
spent most of his career at the European University Institute, and even Christoph
Moellers now holds a five year position as a Permanent Fellow at the Berlin
Institute for Advanced Study. Such promotion of excellence is desirable. But if the
Wissenschaftsrat really wants to change legal scholarship in Germany, it must, as it
does, also focus on the breadth of existing institutions.
In view of all of this, my original claim that German doctrinal scholarship will always
be superior to that of other nations should hardly sound triumphant. The main reason
for this prediction is not some German innate superiority, nor cultural determinism,
but rather a practical fact: other countries do not focus nearly as much on legal
doctrine as Germany. Rob Howse points out that US scholars produce “subtle and
careful commentary on appellate and Supreme Court jurisprudence”. In 19th century
Germany, such commentary would have been considered nothing more than “lower
jurisprudence,” a mere preliminary stage for “true, scientific, jurisprudence”. German
“high” doctrine is on a level of its own and will remain alone there, simply because
other countries will hardly want to build a similar expertise that looks dated, at the
cost of other developments. (As Howse himself says: nobody would buy it.) Many, in
Germany and elsewhere, rightly see this traditional near-exclusive focus on doctrine
as an actual current weakness, a relic of the past that has not only isolated German
scholarship in the global discourse, but has also put education and scholarship out
of touch with the needs of contemporary Germany to be left behind. If this weakness
can be turned into a strength, as the Wissenschaftsrat suggests, Howse may think
this conservative; I think it would be a remarkable achievement.
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